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Constituting Postcommunism: 
The Intelligentsia, Civil Society and Round Tables in Hungary and poland' 
Michael D. Kennedy 
The most prominent actor in the 1989 transformation of Eastern Europe was the intelligentsia, a class 
whose basis for power is its control over a special form of teleological knowledge, and a culturally constituted group 
whose claim to authority is its historic role as leaders of East European nations. On the basis of their claim to 
represent civil society, the intelligentsia, in association with the communist authorities, developed a form of 
transformative praxis, the Round Table, which enabled the peacefid yet fundamental transformation of Soviet-type 
society. In the wake of such "negotiated revolutions"~ the intelligentsia appeared to win political a~thority.~ What 
enabled the intelligentsia to win this kind of political power, and does the mode of its victory matter for subsequent 
political and social transformations? 
Answers to such questions require a broad comparative and historical sociology of the transformations 
wrought by the praxis of 1988-91. It is far beyond the ambition and capacity of this essay to address changes 
throughout Eastern Europe. I nevertheless believe that the comparison between Hungary and Poland isextremely 
important. 
At first glance, these transformations were substantially different. The Polish transformation was based on 
a crossclass alliance in civil society against die authorities, while the Hungarian transition depended more on a 
negotiated alliance between Party reformers and opposition intellectuals. As such, one might argue that these two 
d 
cases represent Fundamental alternatives in tlie making of consequential postcolnmunist social and political change. 
In the broader scope of things, liowvever, they are also remarkably similar. These two societies moved the 
transformation of all Soviet-type societies. They tested the limits of tolerance in Soviet foreign policy and they 
developed the particular mode of transfonnation - the Round Table - tllat enabled tlie peaceful but Fundamental 
transformation of tlic system. 
Gorbacl~cv's perestroika was of course tl~c ncccsary condition for systc~nic transformation in Eastern 
Europe, but it was itsclf movcd by t l~c sperienccs of Poland and Hungary. Both Poland and Hung'uy werc 
observed closely by Soviet authorities as a model for communism's transfor~nation.~ Nevertlleless, General 
Jaruzelski's failure to restore economic and political order without compromise with Solidarity meant that the 
Soviets were facing few options in Poland at Ule end of the 1980s other than invasion or allowing emancipation. 
The relative costs of the invasion and wilhdrawal of troops from Afghanistan probably suggested to many Soviet 
leaders that emancipation would cost the USSR far less than occupation. Thus, while Gorbachev's "Sinatra 
doctrine" was critical to enabling the emancipation of Eastern Europe, this Soviet reorientation was made also by the 
politics on Moscow's periphery. 
These were eventlid politics.' Polisll struggles enabled the development of the first successN example of 
Round Table negotiations, concluded on April 5, 1989. The Hungarian authorities and opposition both learned fiom 
these Polish developments. The opposition formed the Opposition Round Table on March 22, 1989, approximating 
in Hungarian conditions that which proved successful for Polish S~lidarity:~ The Hungarian authorities.also took . 
the lead in some ways, especially in international relations. They tore down the barbed wire on their border with 
Austria on May 2, 1989, enabling East Gennan citizens to escape to Western Europe. When the Hungarian 
authorities announced on September 11 that they would not repatriate refugees to their country of origin, East 
German citizens fled through Hungary for the West by the thousands.' The Polish electoral results of June 4, and 
the invitation to form a Solidarity-led government under Tadeusz Mazowiecki on August 24, 1989, dramatically 
expanded the notion of what was possible in Eastern Europe. Given the outcomes of the Polish negotiations, the 
Hungarian authorities themselves were moved to negotiate with the opposition. After inaugural speeches on June 
13, the Hungarian autllorities used the Round Table to position tllemselves to win legitimacy through electoral 
means. 
These democratic transformations in Poland and Hungary were not lost on the rest of the region. 
b 
Emigration and demonstrations in East Gennany during the fall led to the collapse of the Berlin Wall on November 
9. Willlout hardline allies in Poland, Hung'uy or East Gcnnany, Uie Czeclioslovak authorities were increasingly 
isolated, and h e  opposition felt increasingly empowered. Buildng on Ule esa~nples of their neighbors, the 
opposition developed its own Civic Forum and negotiated its own revolution, culminating in the election of Vaclav 
Have1 as Prcsidcnt on December 29, 1989. In Llus contest, Bulgarian authorities attempted their own perestroika 
from Nove~nber 10 till December 14, which itself Icd to Round Table negotiations there in January of 1990. 
Romania's violent conflict bctwcen Dccelnber 16 and 23, 1989 provided telcviscd csamplcs to the region, and to the 
world, of the violent alternative to communism's negotiated end. Keeping Uie transformation off the streets and at 
the negotiating table was a longstanding ambition even for Ule Poles and the Hungarians who didn't have the benefit 
of the Romanian counteresanple. The initiatives of Poles and Hungarians provided the esmnple for the peaceful 
transition of Eastern Europe. 
The success of their initiatives depended on the elevation of the intelligentsia as the representative of civil 
society in Round Table negotiations. This parallel acquisition of authority depended, however, on very different 
processes in Poland and Hungary. The timing of compromise and the dependencies of the intelligentsia were 
consequentially different.* Wlule in both cases, the intelligentsia has since "retired from the stagew9 the intellectual 
politics they undertook in the late 1980s continues to shape the alternatives within postcommunist capitalism 
available today. In this essay, I shall emphasize the process by which the intelligentsia won this authority and 
developed this particular mode of emancipatory praxis. I'll conclude by considering some of the implications of my 
comparison for subsequent social and political change in Hungary and Poland. 
The Intelligentsia and Civil Society in Hungary and Poland 
The Soviet-type system reinforced the prominence, already considerable before World War 11, of the 
intelligentsia. As it enlarged the ranks of the intelligentsia with the expansion of higher education, it simultaneously 
made the autonomous intellectual scarce, thus elevating its value in cultural politics.'0 Revisionism offered a 
marvelous strategy for the intellectual to redefine Lhe communist project, and elevate the intellectual's role in 
political authority. That explicitly marked project of revisionism failed, however, especially after the March 1968 
repression in Poland, and the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia later that year. From that time forward in 
Poland, it would be diflicult, if not impossible, to describe intellectuals as being on tlle road to class power.'' 
In Hunrrary, by contrast, tlle intelligentsia remained on tlle road to class power, at least ~luough the 
beginning of the 1970s. I' Wlule Konrad and Szelenyi's thesis was certainly contentious,I3 by the end of the 1980s 
this vision of co~n~nunist rule may have triumphed. At least the Ncmetll goverruncnt in 1989 called itself a 
.'government of espcrts".lJ Morc broadly, one might interpret Gorbachev's vision of perestroika, and the hopes of 
other rcform communists to rest on thc foundations of such a vision of rule by tl~c intelligentsia. In Poland, tllat 
vision proved irnpossiblc to cultivate undcr co~nmunist rulc, dcspitc the attclnpt by communist autlloritic~.!~ 
The Polish politics of intellectual rcsponsibility put temfic pressure on intellectuals to choose whether they 
would serve civil society or the authorities. The seeds for this kind of antagonistic politics could be found in the 
failure of revisionism in 1968, but Llie failure of Gierek's approacll to professionalism was the final blow. The 
politics of Solidarity 1980-8 1 assured tlat intellectual responsibility would lie with the intelligentsia's immersion in 
civil society identified in opposition to the authorities.I6 Already in 1976, Adam Michnik among others insisted that 
revisionism and neo-positivism were no longer viable, while his Hungarian counterpart, Janos Kis, was still insisting 
a decade later that "the resolution of the country's crisis is conceivable only in the form of compromise"." 
There were many lessons of 1956 for Hungarians, but one of the most important may have been that 
compromise is better than fundamental confrontation. Kis writes, 
Hungarian society has yet to come to terms with the total defeat it suffered at that time, and those in power 
have yet to overcome the burdens of their victory. The economic crisis which in the 80s overwhelms 
Hungary is the crisis of the restoration regime which came into existence thirty years ago.. . Today we must 
remember the restoration not just in order to regain moral integrity, but in order to understand the present 
political crisis of the regime. We have to analyze former (failed) proposals of conciliation in order to find a 
more effective compromise to our present and future (perhaps less hopeless situation). The events of 1956- 
57 develop from a moral issue into a political one.'' 
Kis's analysis of tlut period clearly informs, and reflects, Uie Hungarian political strategy of the 1980s. He 
follows a fonn of historical explanation based on radical contingency rather than deterministic logic. He emphasizes 
how various "accidents" shaped subsequent events. For instance, lad there been no Soviet tanks introduce to 
Budapest on 23 October, a new government under the aegis of the People's Patriotic ~ r b n t  might have been formed 
and a multi-party system not become inevitable.I9 Or when the Kadar government took power with the aid of Soviet 
tanks, the Kadarism of that period2', could have been replaced by the retrieval of Stalinists or by a negotiated 
compromise witli Ilnre ~ a ~ ~ . ~ '  
This kind of lustorical esplanation encourages tlie adoption of a political strategy based on compromise 
rather tlm fundamentalist politics. In particular, Kis studics tlie strategies of tllc workers' council movement as 
examples, especially significant given tlat they survived the formal restoration of the Kadar government in 
Budapest on 7 Novcmbcr. Tllc pcaccful rcsista~~cc by thc Grcatcr Budapest Ccntnl Workers Council. formed on. 14 
November, was tllc first cscmplar of sophisticated co~npro~liise politics. Tllcy gradually droppcd Llleir demands for 
the restoration of the Nagy government and multiparty system as well as the departure of Soviet troops in favor of 
promoting tlle self-organization of workers' councils as well as council access to an open public sphere.22 The 
Stalinist wing of the Party had grown increasingly strong toward the end of November, however, and provoked 
enough violent conflict to end the possibility of negotiations with politically minded workers councils. The second 
phase of council resistance was dominated by the Csepel Iron and Metal Works workers council, which had 
advocated a less political function for councils, and took the restored Kadarist regime as its point of departure, not 
the ideals of the Hungarian revolution. But by 8-1 1 January, the possibility of even this kind of compromise was 
ruined by the increasing hard line of the Kadarist government, and the violent suppression of a strike by that 
factory's workers. These compromise strategies might have worked, he thinks, had the international scene and 
internal conflicts been different. 
These council activities give him the inspiration for seeking a politics of compromise in the search for 
democracy.23 But the legacy of 1956 has destroyed that democratic capacity already proven. To cope with the 
demand Kadar made, that society "forget" its experience in return for material compensation? society had to 
withdraw into private life. Under these circumstances, Kis writes,2s 
. Whether a privatized society identifies with its defeated struggles or tries to forget them depends decisively 
on what its spiritual leaders - writers, journalists, artists, Iustorians, priests, teachers - articulate. They, 
after all, are in the position tllat, by virtue of their profession, tlieir words and silence constitute a public 
statement. It depends on them to decide if tliey will provide symbols of loyalty and models of endurance to 
be emulated. In Hungary, this stratum did not supply society with the instruments to enable it to remain 
loyal to its revolution while making peace with reality. Indeed, the selfsame intelligentsia evolved into the 
source and foundation of Uie consensus that insists that the cultivation of intellectual opposition is a 19' 
century romantic pose and inappropriate to Realpolitik. 
In contrast to Hungary, Poland had no shortage of opposition or surplus of silence. Indeed, this was 
partially a consequence of its 1956. For Poland, 1956 was initially a year of triumph, a time when Polisll party 
autliorities defied Soviet autliorities, opened new cultural boundaries, ended experiments with agricultural 
collectivization, cslablisllcd better relations with the Cadlolic Church, and legalized greater workplace democracy 
througll workers councils. Even if this "Polisl~ Octobcr" led to disappoint~nent a few years later, and outriglit 
rejection by 1968, i t  was a Far cry fro111 tlle total defeat tllat 1956 signified for Hungary's opposition. '' 
By 1980 in Poland, 1956 barely figured into tl~e opposition's consciousness. The legacy of workers' 
councils and revisionist Party politics was far less important to consider than the issues raised by the 1968, 1970/71 
and 1976 events which made independent trade unions, the loyalties of intellectuals, and the making of civil society 
central to the transfonnative agenda. The development of tile Solidarity movement over 1980-8 1 made those 
strategic emphases socially real phenomena. The politics of compromise that Kis advocated in the mid 1980s was 
morally reprehensible for many Polish intellectuals. In fact, it is only a slight exaggeration to say that the imposition 
of martial law on December 13, 1981, turned the Polish intelligentsia, writ large, into an opposition to Jaruzelski's 
regime. Poland established its "exceptionalism" with the militance and organization of its working class. The 
politics of intellectual responsibility became a matter of where one allied, rather than whether one would be public 
or private in the exercise of intellectual responsibility. This created the social foundation for a strong politics of 
intellectual opposition and opposition to any compromise that could resemble cooptation. 
The contrast could not be clearer. In the late 1970s and early 1980s in Hungary, the opposition was 
relatively limited, and it was limited primarily to intelligentsia and students. Samizdat materials, a private charity to 
help the poor, the beginning of a tolerated political opposition in the 1985 Parliamentary elections, and an 
independent peace movement characterized the opposition in the first half of the decade. The environmental 
movement called the Danube Circle proved one of the most significant opposition activities by mid decade. In 
Poland, the 9.5 million member Solidarity movement, with its base among skilled workers in large factories and the 
support of the Catholic Church, promised that the opposition was socially broad, and not limited to the highly 
educated. This distinction would infonn the way in which the politics of the Round Table could be constructed. In 
Hungary, the politics of civil society depended on the intelligentsia's organizations; in Poland, the politics of civil 
society was based on the intelligentsia's inunersion in the activities of other social groups. The Hungarian 
intelligentsia led by default. The leadership of the Polish intelligentsia was hardly guaranteed. 
The Hegemony of the Hungarian Intelligentsia 
Although today the Polisll case is treated as "exceptional"27 in the 1980s the Polish case established the 
baseline for asking why workcrs wcre not oppositional in oll~er societies, notably ~ u n g a r ~ . "  The authorities of other 
colnlnunist Icd counlrics may not I~ivc lrcalcd ~lic Polish casc as a basclinc. but certainly considcrcd its esamplc a 
ducal." The Hungarian au~l~orilics U~cmsclvcs could fralnc U~cir econonlic reforms in ordcr to providc a 
"propllylactic measure to thwart Ule sprcad of Polish Solidarity-inspired labor activism".30 Whatever the reasons for 
the implication of Hungarian workers in painting rather than dismantling socialism?' it is relatively clear that the 
opposition was ovenvllelmed by the leaderslup of tlle Hungarian intelligentsia. 
There were two dominant currents of Hungarian intelligentsia in the making of the negotiated revo~ution.~~ 
The populists were numerically the largest group, and hardest to define formally. Five of its nine founding members 
were poets and writers. They identified their movement with the needs of the Hungarian nation, defined ethnically 
or racially. They generally spoke of a "third road" between capitalism and communism. The authorities had 
cultivated them as an ally, especially since the 1956 revolution, although in the mid-1980s the populists began to 
identify with some projects of the democratic opposition. The populists formed the Hungarian Democratic Forum 
(HDF) in 1987 and generally avoided technical programs for economic transition in favor of literary emotional 
politics. They preferred "intuition to analysis, and literature to social science". 33 Until the November referendum 
on the timing of the Presidential election, they were the most successful in Hungarian transition politics, having won 
each of the four elections in the summer of 1989. They finally won the spring elections in 1990 and together with 
the Smallholders and Christian Democrats formed the governing coalition in mid-1990. But in tlle beginning of the 
revolution, they were the most closely allied with the refonnist Party leader, Imre ~ o z s g a ~ . ~ "  
The other significant group of intellectuals in the negotiated revolution was called pro-western, democratic, 
liberal and urban. Many had their origins in the Budapest School of critical Marsism, and many were of Jewish 
descent. From 1981, their main efforts were directed toward the independent journal Beszelo, but in 1988 they 
formed the Alliance of Free Democrats (AFD). Their program for institutional reform was generally considered the 
most elaborate and formally specified of all of the opposition. They were often allied informally with reformers 
within the authorities, especially the reformist legal experts and economists. Many other political w e s  and social 
groups formed in tlle wake of the political openings of 1988, but tllese liberals and tlleir.populist opponents 
represented the dounin'ult alternative tendencies in tlle Hungarian opposition. And Ulat was reflected in the spring 
1990 elections, as these two parties received the most votes. 
Tlle populism of dle HDF reproduced Llle traditional form of Hungarian twentieth century nationalism. 
Above all, they wcrc concerned will1 the fate of Hungarian minorities living abroad. They also promoted the idea of 
Hungary being so~ncllow special and in between cast and \vest. dcscrving its own unique identity based on an 
indcpcndcnt s~llall holding pasantry. But by 1989, tllcir etnolivc program did not suggest as radical a msformation 
of the Soviet-type system as the Free Democrats, for tlie main question of institutional transformation was not based 
on cultural matters or agriculture's ownership. The Soviet-type system's main antagonist had become the 
institutionalization of a free market-bascd civil society, and it was the AFD that promoted this as an alternative to 
the Forum's populism, and as tlle means for Ihe transformation of Soviet-type society. 
This group had already begun to move down that liberal road in the beginning of the 1980s. Much as in 
Poland, civil society became the principal alternative politics of emancipation to that of nationalism. To struggle in 
the Soviet-type system for the rule of law rather than that of the Party, for free associations instead of Party- 
sponsored organizations, for freedom from censorship and a multi-party system provided Hungarians, like Poles, 
with a coherent transformative strategy that did not have to elevate one's nation above others. Gyorgy Konrad 
expressed this simply :35 
We want that internal process with wluch East Central Europe is already pregnant; we want bourgeois civil 
liberties and an embourgeoisment that is not hedged about with prohibatory decrees. We don't want the 
authorities to have discretionary rights over us. We want constitutional guarantees; we want it clear that 
semi-freedom is not freedom, half-truth is not truth, liberalization is not liberalism, democratization is not 
democracy. We want no less tllan what the most advanced democracies already have. 
Unlike the Polish, however, this Hungarian project was not very successful in providing a program that 
mobilizes those beyond students and intelligentsia. The groupings discussed above were mainly composed of 
intellectuals. Two groups formed in 1988-89 illustrate this hegemony of the intelligentsia M e r .  
On 30 March, 1988, tlurty-two young intellectuals, students and workers (although mainly law students) 
established Fidesz, or the League of Young Democrats. The Hungarian acronym was designed intentionally to 
resemble the LatinJidelis, to sy~iibolize the group's aim and character. Fidesz was constructed as an independent 
youth organization tllat would fill the gap left by the Party's youth organization. It was formed on the basis of an 
imagined civil society, with an ambition to make civil society more real. Following Hungarian postwar political 
theorist Islvan Bibo, they argued that the law sllould be made to control tlle state and its rulers, rather than made to 
control the people. It argued Ulat the opposition sllould take rights guarantecd by the constitution seriously, and thus 
treat the law as if it. rather Ulan the Party, ruled. On that basis, Fidesz used il~c onstitutional guarantee of 
association to defend their for~nation. Tlicir lcadcrs were arrcstcd, and lcgal proceedings wcrc begun against them. 
But in Ulc tllrcc montlis of trial, tllc group grew to be morc than 2,000 mcnlbcrs nationwide. Thcy lost Ulc trial, but 
they ultimately won. In January 1989, legislation was passed in the Hungarian parliament that guaranteed rights of 
assembly.36 
As a movement of students and young intellectuals, Fidesz did not claim to represent other classes. The 
group was mainly symbolic and exemplary, hoping tllat tluough their own civil disobedience and pressure for the 
rule of law others might learn how to exercise their own rights. These activists believed that civil society and the 
rule of law would represent the interests of everyone, so long as people could learn to exercise their rights. Fidesz 
activists ultimately would not only seek election to Parliament but also try to promote a broader awareness of legal 
rights and possibilities to workers and especially peasants. Fidesz thus represented the new ccclassless"universalism 
suggested by civil society. For these young lawyers, the e~nancipatory alternative was a law-based society in which 
individuals understand their legal rights and are ready to engage them, and where people's economic needs would be 
satisfied by their participation in a free market of goods and services.!' 
Given the experience of Polish Solidarity, independent trade unions might have suggested an alternative 
future for Hungary, but even they were overwhelmingly from the intelligentsia. On 16 May, 1988, the first 
independent trade union, the Democratic Union of Scientific Workers, representing those who work in the nation's 
research institutes, was founded. They followed a similar strategy as Fidesz, by acting as if a legal state existed. 
Because the Hungarian constitution and labor code had no guidelines about tlle registration of unions, and because 
Hungary accepted tlie International Labor Organization's statements on freedom of association, the Union argued 
that it had the legal right to form.38 Otlier unions of intelligentsia were fonned in its wake, including those of 
filmmakers and teachers. Tlie principal afliliates of the federative Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions, 
founded on 20 December 1988, also were white collar unions. Blue collar workers remained organized by and large 
by the old communist led unions. 
Tlle hegemony of the intelligentsia in tlie construction of Hungarian civil society was not only apparent in 
the personnel of its associations or in tlle philosophies of its proponents. Hungary's negotiated revolution was itself 
derived from tlle interactions of Ulis intelligentsia will1 Party oficials, in typically intellectual fonns: conferences 
and publications. 
The most proximate foundation for Uie negotiated revolution was Hungary's economic crisis. Although not 
so obvious as that in Poland or Ro~nania. by the early 1980s Hungry was in a dangerous econo~liic situation with 
Uic lligllest debt pcr capita level in Eastern Europc. But this crisis nccd not Iuve laid the foundations for dramatic 
change. Tamas Bauer, one of Hungary's leading reform economists, argued that Hungary's economic reform 
depended on tluee conditions: 1) a crisis so profound as to convince both ruling elites and intellectuals that the 
command economy was failing; 2) the existence of a "more or less free intellectual community of economists" and 
3) "the readiness of both scholars and governlnent experts to cooperate and make the necessary c o ~ n ~ r o ~ n i s e s " . ~ ~  
Economic reform in 1968-72 had been sllelved in Hungary, even if the refor~n.economists themselves remained in 
their positions. Economic reform therefore depended on the autonomy of economists and the willingness of political 
authorities to respect their independent expertise. It depended on the restoration of the intelligentsia's traditional 
position of autonomy and authority. But the intelligentsia won this authority not because of tradition or special talent 
but because of the dynamics of change in the Party itself. 
In the spring of 1986, Imre Pozsgay, then General Secretary of the Patriotic People's Front, requested that 
reform economists produce a report on the economic crisis. Published in 1987, this report, entitled "Turnabout and 
Reform", documented the economic crisis and proposed solutions that were heretofore only discussed in samizdat 
form.40 This report was used later by Karoly Grosz to oust longtime leader Janos ~ a d a r . ~ '  While intellectuals and 
their products were being "used by political leaders in their own infighting, this also created the opportunity for 
intellectuals to realize greater autonomous power and influence. 
In June of the mne year, the democratic opposition published "The Social Contract" in Beszelo, in which 
they called for political pluralism, with an independent parliament and freedom of the press, although not yet a 
multi-party system. Later that fall, the populists held a meeting where they established the HDF. Significantly, 
Poszgay was there attempting to establish his base outside the Party. In effect, a small group of Party reformers had 
intended to use this mobilization of reform economists, populists and democratic opposition to change the Party 
leadership. They finally succeeded. 
In May of 1988, Kadar was ousted as First Secretary. Karoly Grosz was but an interim leader, however, as 
his indecisiveness and inability to win significant ilnprovelnents for Hungarian minorities living in Romania 
undercut his position." Between tlie fall of 1988 and winter of 1989, tile Party reformers steadily improved their 
position willun the Party. Simultaneously, Party rhetoric cane to accept more and more the prospects of a multiparty 
system, even if still incorporating Co~n~nunist party leaderslip. But the opposition organized itself into a new body 
that elTcctivcly undcrtnincd cvcn tl~is radical rcfortnist stralcg!. 
The HDF, the AFD, Fidesz, and the Democratic Trade Union of Scientific Workers as well as five other 
groups founded the Opposition Round Table (ORT) on 22 March 1 9 8 9 . ~ ~  Although alliances among the 
"opposition" were proposed before, tlus opposition alliance was much more clearly the product of the opposition 
itself. The ORT was formed in order to assure that negotiations with the authorities would not be manipulated to 
allow the Party unfair influence over the structure of the talks and their outcomes. Indeed, they even modeled 
themselves on the Polish experience, and tried to create through the Roundtable what the Solidarity movement 
created through at least a decade of social conflict.44 In contrast to the popular perception of negotiations in Poland, 
however, the Hungarian Round Table could claim to represent formally less than 1% of the Hungarian population,4s 
and was composed almost entirely of intel~ectuals.~~ Nevertheless, by September 18, 1989, the Hungarians 
' 
negotiated a more complete revisionof the Soviet-type system than the Poles. The revision was finally realized with 
the N l y  open elections of March 25, 1990. Hungary's "weaker" civil society realized a more bdarnental change 
than the better organized Polish one. That, however, was a consequence of timing less than degrees of 
m~bilization.~' 
Thus, the foundation on which the Party reformers thought to extend their influence - independent 
associations of the intelligentsia - became instead the vehicle of an autonomous civil society that would negotiate 
the establishment of a multiparty political party system and inspire the dissolution of the Hungarian Socialist 
Workers Party itself.48 How one interprets the Party's role in its own undoing, and that of the system over which it 
rules, is itself profoundly complicated, and implicated in a complex intellectual politics. To be sure, the communist 
authorities knew that they were undoing what existed, but were not clear about what was replacing it.49 I am 
however quite convinced by Tokes' argument that the reformist elements in the Party were "the ultimate guarantors 
of peaceful transition and negotiated political outcomes".50 It is very difficult to raise the question in the Polish 
environmenfs' but it ought to be posed, and to that I now turn. 
Poland's Mobilization of Morality and Struggle to Negotiate 
Solidarity's size and heterogeneity meant that it could have represented dfferent things to different people. 
Certainly once it evolved beyond a defensive strategy for self-organization and toward a program for institutional 
reconstruction, a lively politics within the movement was llcaltlly if not inevitable. But for the movement to survive 
as a total lnovclncnt of civil society against Ule state, debate had to respect the anchorpoints of Solidarity's self- 
understanding in self-organization, equality and self-government. In 1980-81, dialogue, both explicit and implicit, 
reproduced Ulcse values in tlus cross-class movement. 
Tlle imposition of martial law destroyed the possibility for that continued dialogue, however, and with it, 
the cross-class quality of the movement. The public sphere shrunk, as most people retreated from politics. This 
sphere retreated unevenly, however, as the intelligentsia was more likely to remain actively engaged in politics than 
were workers. The distinction of tlle Solidarity movement then began to fade. The pragmatic construction of a 
political movement that embraces equality, pluralism, and self-management as a condition of crossclass unity 
depends on an open public sphere with broad crossclass participation and a coherent opponent. This breadth could 
not be preserved under conditions of martial law and its aftermath. This new uneven participation has several 
foundations and  manifestation^.'^ 
First, the very condition of martial law presented new dilemmas for the opposition. Who would lead the 
opposition? Should it have a unitary or decentralized and federative character? Should it focus on dramatic actions 
and try to spark immediate reaction, or should it prepare for the long struggle, and build an underground society? 
Should its base remain workers in factory cells, or should it reflect the multiple associational character of a 
pluralistic civil society?s3 Although it presented dilemmas, martial law also reinforced the moralistic qualities of the 
Solidarity movement. The imposition of martial law was one more element testifying to the alien qualities of the 
communist autllorities, and why they could not be trusted. The philosophy of civil society articulated by Michnik 
and others in the 1970s became ever more self evident in tlle 1980s. 
The opposition also fragmented into several currents. smold4  identified the mainstream opposition with 
Walesa, Solidarity and the Temporary Coordinating Colrunission (TKK). Smolar called realists those who 
considered it ineffective to continue to press for Solidarity's relegalization, and advocated coming to terms with the 
system. Smolar recognized another wave as radical for its greater demands than that of the mainstream, pressing for 
some kind of political revolution in Poland. Finally, another tendency noted by Smolar was that characterized by the 
politics of youth, who rejected old for~nulations and sought a new politics resembling more anarchism than socialist 
or labor politics. Intellectuals could be found in all currents. 
Despite tlieir illegiti~nacy among the politically conscious, the Polish authorities of coursc tried to shape the 
strdtcgies of tlle opposition. Tllcy lricd to divide Solidarily along lines of autllority, for instance. Tlrey tried to 
dividc thc undcrground leadcrsllip from rllosc lcadcrs capturcd by the aulhorilics. Thc TKK undcrground. however, 
remained staunch in its commi~nent o respecting the democratic procedures which established the Solidarity 
leaderslup, and Uius insisted tliat Lecll Walcsa was Uie only person who could negotiate on behalf of ~olidarity." 
The Polish authorities also tried to divide tlie classes animating Solidarity, by treating workers and 
intelligentsia very differently. On the one hand, the aulllorities established new unions tllat prornised to realize 
many of the employees' demands for which Solidarity struggled. These new unions were most unsuccessful among 
the intelligentsia and the fields they dominated: health, culture, and universities.% The authorities also treated 
workers more harshly than the intelligentsia for oppositional politics. When interned, members of the intelligentsia 
were generally housed separately from workers, and treated better. The opposition activities of workers were also 
more strictly curtailed. Strikes in enterprises were treated more harshly than actors' and writers' boycotts. Efforts by 
physicians, teachers, academics and artists to establish a more open field of information and culture went relatively 
unhampered. The Minister of Culture even said that while they did not support it, they didn't go out of their way to 
persecute the underground press either." It is not surprising, therefore, that workers' oppositional politics declined 
more dramatically than that of intellectuals. This uneveness had devastating consequences on the class character of 
the opposition. 
The social distance between classes grew in tlus period. Many in the intelligentsia were angry with workers 
for having failed to mount greater resistance to the regime. Negative stereotypes of workers became more 
Solidarity also began to be criticized for having been too socialist, to "w~rkerist".~~ The response of 
workers to tlus criticism was ambivalent. On the one hand, they again began to identify the intelligentsia with their 
supervisors rather Uian with tllemselves. On tlie other, they began to rely more on the intelligentsia for maintaining 
the ~pposition.~' For instance, Zbigniew Bujak, one of tlie members of the Temporary Coordinating Commission 
and leader of the Warsaw/Mazowsze underground Solidarity lnovelnent from 1981-86, found most of his safe 
apartments among intclligentsia li~useliolds.~' 
Tlie intelligentsia tlius realized its rcsponsibility, but in the process, also assumed greater autonomy from 
tlie existing factory-based movements among workers. Vie ancliorpoints of Solidarity's self understanding, in social 
self organization, equality and self-managcmcnt, were no longer decisive in dcfining the programs of the opposition, 
as the intclligentsia was no longer dependent on workers. Drawing upon the symbolism of Solidarity, if not its 
organization, intellectuals could now clainl to represcnt workcrs, but only as lllcy rcprcscntcd tllc Polisll nation. But 
what kind of intcllcctu;~l politics ~niglit claim tlie ~nantlc of Solidarity? 
Tlle regime itself clearly tried to shape tllat choice. On the one hand, it treated most harshly those like 
Kornel Monwiecki of Fighting Solidarity, Leszek Moczulski of the Confederation for an Independent Poland, and 
others who advocated some kind of revolutionary, even if non-violent, politics. It lambasted the youth-based 
Freedom and Peace (Wolnox i Pokoj or w ~ P ) ~ '  as traitorous to Polish society. On the other hand, it also 
encouraged the realists by offering selective inducements for cooperation. 
For those willing to cooperate with the regime, Jaruzelski established a "consultative council", with about 
one-third of its members from the regime, one-third from Catholic circles and one-third independent intellectuals. 
The Solidarity leadership criticized that Council, established on December 6, 1986, for the deliberate exclusion of 
the Solidarity's intellectuals. Only a few prominent and independent intellectuals, notably Wladyslaw Sila-Nowicki, 
Andrzej Swiecicki, and Andnej Tymowski, joined it. But its significance went beyond its effect on Solidarity; 
Jaruzelski dates his "conversion" to the belief that dialogue with Solidarity was possible to the formation of this 
In this sense, the meaningfblness of dialogue as an intellectual value was being spread to the Party through 
such organizations. Cooptation could work both ways. Likewise, PRON, the Patriotic Movement for the Renewal 
of the Nation, was indeed an attempt by the authorities to coopt the opposition. It was also, however, one of the 
institutions among the authorities where the value of dialogue, rather than the spirit of repression, could be promoted 
by people like Janusz ~ e j k o w s k i . ~  
Nevertheless, it is apparent that as the authorities began to move toward dialogue, they also were 
increasingly interested in constructing a "responsible" partner, one that would respect Poland's system and 
geopolitical realities. The best example of their tolerance was their permission for the establishment in 1987 of the 
first independent, non-religious periodical in the Warsaw Pact, Res Publica. Although still subject to censorship, the 
publication pursued its liberal democratic themes vigorously. 
The regime also encouraged another kind of realism attractive to members of the intelligentsia among 
others. It facilitated the promotion of a new patriotic politics based on the spirit of entrepreneurialism. Although its 
promoters included several former worker activists, this agenda was also anti-worker, arguing that the solution for 
Poland's dilemmas lay in the promotion of a free market economy and private enterprise system based on the 
multiplication of wealth, not in the continuation of workerist politics based on r~distribution.~~ 
In effect, wit11 these activities the Polisll aull~orities were trying to establish a new modus vivendi between 
tllc~n and civil society. But this new agreclncnt was not based on broad public p~rlicipation, as Solidarity had been. 
Instead, it was to be based on a skewed participation, wiUi workers returned to narrow union concerns, and the 
intelligentsia once again establisllcd as the representatives of the nation. One might say that the Polisli authorities 
tried to reconstruct Ule Polish opposition in Uie Hungarian image - with an opposition concentrated among a self- 
limiting intelligentsia. In so doing, the anacluonistic status of autonomous intellectuals in communist politics was 
completely abandoned in the hope that the realism of such intellectuals could restore some measure of dublic 
consensus for the Polish communist order. But this was impossible with the presence of Solidarity. 
Some have suggested that the authorities imprisoned the more militant unionists like Wladek Frasyniuk 
while allowing those more conciliatory figures, like Zbigniew Bujak, to continue their underground existence,66 but 
this is certainly debatable. Indeed, it is a familiar delegitimating tactic among the authorities: the outlaw is free 
because we, the omnipotent state, allow him to remain free. It is hard to believe that the regime would tolerate such 
an obvious blow to their own claims to competence if they could help it. Bujak remained for tlle most part in the 
capital city, and tried to change residences every two weeks for over four years. His very freedom was one of the 
principal goals of the underground movement: to show the weakness of the state, and the strength of the 
underground. He was only apprehended on ~ a y ' 3  1, 1986, when they tried to prepare a major underground 
Solidarity congress one month before the Party's own congre~s.~' 
The arrest of Bujak and two of his colleagues spelled tlie beginning of a new process, the move away from 
the politics of the underground, and toward a politics of negotiating revolution. With the capture of the principal 
symbo1,of Solidarity's underground existence, those witlun the authorities seeking dialogue could increase their 
influence, and the authorities could begin their move toward a politics of negotiation. Of course, they tried to do it 
without Solidarity, as in Jaruzelski's Consultative Council. Solidarity insisted, by contrast, that negotiations could 
not proceed without them. This apparent stale~iiate was broken not only by dell intellectual politics, as in the 
proposal by Bronislaw Gerenick of an anticrisis pact. Just as in 1980, when workers' occupation strikes and 
demand for independent trade unions establislled the possibility for a negotiated settlement leading to Solidarity, in 
1988 workers' protest put the dialogue on a new level. In April-May and especially August, 1988, workers in 
Gdansk and in other places initiated a wave of occupation strikes demanding, among other dungs, increases in 
wages and Solid'arity's restoration. Tlus tnovclncnt was not. however, initiated by Solidarity's activists. This was a 
new generation of workers. who trusted few outside rllcir immediate tnilicu. 
Tlie aulliorities were estrc~ncly apprehensive with this new wave of strikes, fearing that Uiey could not 
contain t l i e ~ n . ~ ~  As such, the authorities Ilad to abandon their strategy for pro~noting a new realismn, and turn to 
another realism represented by tlie old Solidarity leadership. Tlus leadersl~ip was, by now, relatively trustworthy in 
 omp par is on to these new anarchistic youth. Tlie authorities' only hope was tliat these former opponents could 
restrain workers from further strikes. In return, the Solidarity leadership demanded negotiations for Solidarity's 
legalization. At Uie conclusion of August, 1988, tlie path was set for the beginning of the first negotiated revolution. 
It was also an opportunity for the intelligentsia to consolidate its leadership in social transformation. 
Negotiating Revolution and the Contingencies of Change 
The politics of establishing the Roundtable negotiations with were filled with all sorts of contingencies. 
The Church was absolutely critical to establishing the possibility of their negotiations at all. Theywere a "witnessw 
to the negotiations, assuring them legitimacy and indeed honesty in negotiations. Andrzej Gdula, a negotiator for 
. . 
the Communist side, said that ultimately it was Pope John ~ a u l  I1 along with General Jaruzelski who assured this 
peaceful change. Without the direct oversight of the Catliolic Church, these negotiations could never have taken 
place, and most certainly could not have succeeded. 69 One of the most important features of these negotiations, both 
as a prologue to the formal talks but especially in those two months of formal negotiations, was the "melting of 
resentments" among those wlio would neg~tiate.~' 
Negotiations between the authorities and society were not the only challenges before the negotiators, and in 
this domain, the Party probably had the greatest challenge. Were it not for the abysmal performance of the official 
trade union leader, Alfred Miodowicz, in a televised debate with Lech Walesa, Miodowicz and his forces would 
have llad much greater legiti~nacy to block tlie legalization of their principal union rival. Mieczyslaw Rakowski's 
announcement closing the Lenin Shipyards in November 1988 seemed to be designed to signal another kind of 
transition, one that at die least bypassed Solidarity. Sonie have even wondered whether it might have been designed 
to provoke a reaction tlmt would lmve called for UIe imposition of a state of e~nergenc~.~ '  The authorities were not, 
after all, united in tlie wish to dialogue. General Jaruzelski wasn't 100% sure that he would win his bet when he and 
three otlicr leading figures llucatencd to resign in January 1989 in the face of Central Co~n~nittec resistance to 
legalizing Neverthelcss, that gesture suggests Ulat dlc negotiations tl~eui~selvcs depended on a will to 
talk and a capacity for lcadcrsliip Ulat was itself a product of die General's particular biography. There were plenty, 
notably at the middle levels of tlie apparatus. who were absolutely opposed to any such legitimation of ~o l ida r i t~ , '~  
but none with the power to unseat Jaruzelski. 
At last, negotiations were oflicially begun on February 6,  1989 and lasted for two months. Over 400 
people participated in tlie various negotiations. Tliere were three main tables -- on political reform, economic 
reform and on organizational pluralism, wllicli concerned primarily the legalization of Solidarity. There also were 
eleven sub-tables devoted to questions of the media, health care, mining, youth and other issues. Negotiations were 
suprisingly easy on the question of Solidarity's legalization; but they were especially difficult in the political realm, 
for both sides recognized that they were negotiating the future political architecture of Poland. In addition to public 
meetings, private meetings among the top negotiators were held at Magdalenka, a resort outside of Warsaw, and a 
separate room in what would subsequently become the Presidential Palace in Warsaw, where the official 
negotiations took place. In these entirely unrecorded meetings, the most profound obstacles were overcome.74 
Compromises were finally reached, but the outcomes of those negotiations were not as most expected. 
The opposition was frankly surprised by how much was accomplished in the negotiations. Beyond 
Solidarity's legalization, completely competitive elections were arranged to be held on June 5, 1989 for a new 
Senate; 35% of the seats in Uie lower house of Parliament, the Sejm, would also be contested. The rest were given 
to the governing alliance. And Uie Parliament, with communists and their allies assured most of the seats, would 
elect General Jaruzelski as President with relatively unspecified powers. 
The authorities were not the only ones to have dissension in their ranks, although the opposition's troubles 
became more vigorous later in the process. There were some protests that this was a "disgmcehl compromise with 
communists"; the All-Poland Conference of Independent Youth Environments was organized under Uie slogan that 
"one cannot negotiate freed~m";~' otliers complained that Solidarity's negotiators and its candidates were not chosen 
democratically.76 Nevertheless, tlie legitimacy of these protests was limited because Uiose who suffered most in 
prison, like Ada111 Miclmik and Jacek Kuron. and leaders of the Solidarity underground during the 1980s, including 
Zbigniew Buj'ak, put Llieir entire reputation behind llie talks. Equally important was the Church, and indirectly the 
Pope himself. Tlie presence of Tadeusz Goclowski, Bronislaw Dabrowski and Aloyzy Orszulik during negotiations 
legitimized hat part of Solidarity hat con~prornised with co~n~nunis ts .~~ 
Solidarity's election campaign was based on a new organization, Cllc so called Citizens' Committees. 
Tlicsc groups wvcre not elected by any fornial body, lnucli less by Solidarity's rcnlaining trade union base. They 
were, in addition, co~nposed primarily of representatives of the inte~li~entsia.~~ Of Solidarity's 26 1 nominations, 
only 10 were of workers and 35 of individual farmers. in contrast, there were 22 professors, 50 engineers, 35 
lawyers, 20 journalists or colu~nnists, 16 economists, 14 teachers, 13 health care employees and 1 religion teacher.79 
These candidates chosen to represent Solidarity were not elected either, and rather picked by Lech Walesa and his 
closest advisors, much as the Round Table negotiators were chosen.80 Their most effective campaign element was a 
photograph of each candidate with Walesa., below which was written "We must win"." 
The ascent of the intelligentsia in post-com~nunist politics is not unusual, of course. Like the Polish 
Roundtable negotiators, nearly all of the ~nelnbers of tile Hungarian Opposition Round Table were inte~lectuals.~~ 
Too, in both late communism and post-communism, in ~ u n ~ a r y ~ ~  as well as across the Soviet Union at the end of 
the decade, 84 the intelligentsia surged in parliamentary representation. One can view the whole process of reform, 
whether led by communists or opposition, as a process by which the intelligentsia sought greater authority and 
sought to establish its own particular modes of decision making and policy making on communist politics and 
programs. In both Hungary and Poland, it was quite apparent that the intelligentsia and Party reformers sought a 
way out of the impasse without allowing the streets to dictate the outco~nes.~~ But the particular dependencies of the 
intelligentsia and the timing of their negotiations vary significantly. Poland blazed the trail toward the Round Table. 
The Polish negotiations served as a model for the formation of the Hungarian Opposition Round Table coalition of 
forces. Too, had Poland not already resolved its own negotiations on April 5, 1989, Grosz and the Hungarian 
Politburo may not have begun their own Round Table  negotiation^.^^ Nevertheless, as a relative latecomer, the 
Hungarian Round Table had fewer consuictions placed around what could be negotiated, and therefore generated a 
much more radical reform U l a n  Ulat which the Polisll reform provided.87 
Some of tlre very imponant faultlines around which subsequent politics has taken place can be traced to the 
ways in wluch Ute intelligentsia establislled its leadership. Wlule there were several contingencies in the politics of 
refor111 and referenda that reconstructed llre politics of Hungary tran~ition?~ one can see in the Hungarian Round 
Table negotiations the electoral process in the making, as parties jockeyed for position.89 As Tokes put it, "the 
Hungarian NRT (National Round Table) may be likened to a coperative, yet co~npetitive multiplayer game."'' The 
Polislr negotiations were not anything like Ulat, and Solidarity's electoral success was not something that anyone 
anticipated. 
General Kiszczak told me that 111e com~nunists were not negotiating away their power.g1 They expected, 
rather, to legalize Solidarity as an opposition, make Clle~n co-responsible for economic reform, and then in another 
four years liold entirely free elections. Tllings did not turn out as tliey espected. The authorities anticipated that 
Solidarity would at Uie most win 40% of tlie seats in tlie Senate, and not 99 out of 100 as tliey ultimately did. They 
did not expect that so few communists and their allies would get the minimum number of votes necessary to enter 
parliament in the first round of elections. They were shocked at how little support they won. With this terrific vote 
of opposition from society, even those fonnerly allied with the communists began to rethink their allegiances. Had 
several Solidarity delegates not absented themselves from voting, General Jaruzelski would not have been elected 
president. Even later, when General Kiszczak was asked to form the first government, he could not; Solidarity 
delegates explained to him that they could not take charge of the economic portfolios in his government, and he 
could not fonn a government without them. The society voted for change, and to form a government with the old 
ruling alliance would be impossible. Turning to those magic words provided by Adam Michnik publically on July 
$+ 3,1989 in his newspaper Gazeta Wvborcza, General Jaruzelski (your president) finally asked Tadeusz Mazowiecki 
(our premiere) to form the government on August 24. 
Of course this was not the end to the.contigencies of change in Poland in 1989. Prime Minister 
+ .  Mazowiecki felt like a "saper" or minesweeper in his initial days in ~ f i c e . ' ~  He was concerned that the security 
.. forces would support hirn and his government. He asked General Kiszczak and General Siwicki to join his cabinet as 
Ministers of the Interior and of National Defense, which they finally did.93 It was not obvious that one could assume 
that those with the weapons would be loyal to those forces they so recently llad in prison. Prime Minister 
Mazowiecki went to tliose very security forces two weeks after becoming Prime Minister to tell them that he 
espected their loyalty. Apparently lie got it. 
Likewise, the Hungarian authorities also took actions to assure tllat the intentions of the Round Table 
agreements and elections would be followcd. They disbanded the Workers Guard and Hungarian Army Commando 
Units raided tlie Workers Guard weapons store~iouses.~~ Tliese actions undertaken by tlie communist-led 
goverrunent were a major step toward assuring the peaceful transformation. Communists in Poland have no such 
vivid esa~iiples of their own Icadcrslip in assuring such a change. Solidarity gets most of the credit. and that is 
consequent ial. 
Today in Poland, the contingencies of these cllanges are not easily remembered. Mira Marody was 
surprised when she heard about Mazowiecki's self understanding as a minesweeper. Tlut is a surprise, she said, 
because for most of us tlie change looked so easy. It was alniost as if it came strdiglit from the Bible, where the 
words of Solidarity intellectual Adam Micllnik -- "your president, our premiere" -- were made flesh or real9' 
Instead, it can look like a conspiracy. And here lies the major difference between Poland and Hungary. 
The Contrasting Implications of Negotiated Revolutions 
Even as late as the October 1998 local government elections in Poland, representatives of the Union of 
Freedom were constantly being asked whether they might fonn local coalitions with the descendents of Poland's 
communist party. Typically coy, party spokespersons would emphasize decentralized decision making and the 
importance of local conditions for dictating alliances. They are, after all, fonning a national government together 
with the AWS or Solidarity. To fonn alliances with the Union of the Democratic Left might confirm the impression 
that they are, in fact, as "pink" as Inany of their detractors claim. Even worse, this might confirm that the discussion 
of the Roundtable as "Betrayal" has merit in the defeat of the Solidarity movement and its Church supporters at the 
electoral box. 
The Union of Freedom is above all the party of the intelligentsia that in 1989 negotiated revolution with the 
communists. To be sure, Solidarity was the movement on which the claim by the intellectuals to represent civil 
society could find its real social power, but the movement was hardly united even during 1989. Walesa and his 
advisors were directing the course of the social transformation, and were no longer in a circumstance where their 
legitimacy as the movement's leadership could be r W ~ r m e d  procedurally. It was taken for granted, and assumed 
given the extraordinary results of the June 1989 elections. But when Lech Walesa challenged Tadeusz Mazowiecki 
for the Presidency of Poland in 1990, the fictive unity of tlle rnovelnent was finally destroyed. Mazowiecki's 
supporters turned to what eventually becalile tlie Union of Freedom, while Walcsa went on to beco~ile President. 
Tlle trade union came under tlle leaderslup of a new generation that was not prominent at all in the suuggles of the 
1980s. And Ulen Ule p w y  of former co~n~ilunists came back to power in Lllc parliament, and Uleir representative, 
Aleksandcr Kwasniewski, defeated Lecl~ Walcsa in his bid for reelection as president. 
Hungary and Poland liave sllared this return of for~ner conl~~~unisls to power. In both cases, this rcignitcd a 
discussion of wlictllcr tllc Negotiated Revolutions were suK~cicntly rcvolulionary as to rid tllc country of tllc former 
oppressors. But the parallels end Uicre. Thc Hungarian negotiations of 1989 were based on a premise of political 
positioning, while tlie Polish talks were about power sharing. In Hungary, the opposition was sufficiently 
fragmented, and responsibility for the success, or failure, of the Roundtable negotiations was dispersed. 
Consequently, tlle Roundtable negotiations cannot be held to be the responsibility of any single actor or particular 
collusion of interests. Indeed, precisely because it became this setting for the contest of political parties, the charges 
of justice and injustice can be played out on the field of electoral competition. Witliout the equivalent of a 
Magdalenka, where "secret deals" could be made between communists and a unified opposition, the Hungarian 
negotiated revolution can be associated relatively unambiguously with the opening of the public sphere. Poland's 
negotiated revolution remains mired in anxieties over dealmaking. 
Another anxiety afflicting Poland more than Hungary concerns the moral evaluation of communist 
authorities. The Hungarian authorities could be distinguished relatively easily into reformers and hardliners, those 
responsible for the sins of the past, and those seeking an exit from tliose compromising times. In Poland, by 
contrast, the general who imposed martial law in 1981 was also the general who enabled the Round Table talks to 
come into being. The general responsible for hunting down the opposition and imprisoning them was also the man 
who led the authorities in negotiation. The distinctions and definitions of hardliner and reformer are much more 
difficult to draw in Poland than in Hungary. This dilemma is not only a problem for rational choice theorists; 
instead, it is a complex problenl tliat vexes contemporary Polisli politics. 
Poland's struggle to end co~ilinunism was based not only on the nlobilization of workers, but the 
mobilization of morality. It was not only based on tlie struggle for Uie rule of law, but the struggle to realize justice. 
Intellectuals negotiated revolution in all the Round Table transformations. In Poland, however, the intellectuals' 
leadership was built on tlie sacrifice and struggle by ordinary people. It was not won by default, as in Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia, East Ger~nany or Bulgaria. It could not be portrayed as simply a logocratic transformation, as 
miglit be tlie case in ~ u n g a r y . ~  Tlie right to represent Poland's civil society was based on their own moral claims to 
llaving suffered and Icd tlie long struggle of otliers who also sflercd. Under these conditions, it is much more 
diff~cult o portray tlie Polish ncgotiations as a political game, as one might in Hungiry. And tlkit alTects how one 
can view the process of political rcalign~nent in postco~n~nunist deolocracy. 
If stratcgically advantagcous and idcologically plausible, tl~c alliance bctwccn Hungary's Socialist Party 
and its Frce Dcalocrats could bc ~~lndc. In Poland, by contrast, tl~c dcbatc about liic collusion of tlic libcral 
intelligentsia will~ the communists is not over and it has prevented the alliance between liberal opposition and liberal 
postcoin~nunist forces froin taking place. The politics of morality and the mobilizational potential of Polish civil 
society keep the debates of the 1980s alive in the 1990s. Altliougl~ inorality politics and the rhetoric of betrayal have 
its place in Hungarian politics, it remains on ll~e margins." One can't say where it will fall in Poland given the way 
in wluch the aulhority of the intelligentsia was constituted in die struggle to end communism. 
The comparison between Polish and Hungarian negotiated revolutions also highlights the complex politics 
of intellectual responsibility in late communism and postcommunism. The intelligentsia was required to navigate 
an intellectual politics that was simulianeously moral and tactical, principled and political. To the extent that its 
moral leadersliip remains intact, its cultural role as leaders of East European nations might remain viable. In Poland, 
therefore, the elevation of morality politics around co~nmunism and Call~olicism enables not only the Church, but 
also the intelligentsia, to regain a measure of influence in developing the postcommunist polity. But where 
intellectual politics are subordinated to the rules of electoral contest, tlle accounting of capitalist enterprise, or the 
legal adjudication of difference, we are more likely witnessing the end of the intelligentsia, and its replacement with 
professionalism as llie principal inode of intellectual power in postcommunis~n. 
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